1805.
Rapidity of Napoleon's victories—Murat at Wertingen—Conquest of
Ney's duchy—The French army before Ulm—The Prince of Liechtenstein
at the Imperial headquarters—His interview with Napoleon described
by Rapp—Capitulation of Ulm signed by Berthier and Mack—Napoleon
before and after a victory—His address to the captive generals—
The Emperor's proclamation—Ten thousand prisoners taken by Murat—
Battle of Caldiero in Italy—Letter from Duroc—Attempts to retard
the Emperor's progress—Fruitless mission of M. de Giulay—The first
French eagles taken by the Russians—Bold adventure of Lannes and
Murat—The French enter Vienna—Savary's mission to the Emperor
Alexander.
To convey an idea of the brilliant campaign of 1805 from an abstract of the reports and letters I received at Hamburg I should, like the almanac-makers, be obliged to note down a victory for every day. Was not the rapidity of the Emperor's first operations a thing hitherto unprecedented? He departed from Paris on the 24th of September, and hostilities commenced on the 2d of October. On the 6th and 7th the French passed the Danube, and turned the enemy's army. On the 8th Murat, at the battle of Wertingen, on the Danube, took 2000 Austrian prisoners, amongst whom, besides other general officers, was Count Auffemberg. Next day the Austrians fell back upon Gunsburg, retreating before our victorious legions, who, pursuing their triumphal course, entered Augsburg on the 10th, and Munich on the 12th. When I received my despatches I could have fancied I was reading a fabulous narrative. Two days after the French entered Munich—that is to say, on the 14th—an Austrian corps of 6000 men surrendered to Marshal Soult at Memingen, whilst Ney conquered, sword in hand, his future Duchy of Elchingen. Finally, on the 17th of October, came the famous capitulation of General Mack at Ulm,' and on the same day hostilities commenced in Italy between the French and Austrians, the former commanded by Massena and the latter by Prince Charles.
—[Prince Maurice Liechtenstein was sent by General Mack as a flag
of truce to the Imperial headquarters before Ulm. He was, according
to custom, led blindfold on horseback. Rapp, who was present,
together with several of Napoleon's aides de camp, afterwards spoke
to me of the Prince's interview with the Emperor. I think he told
me that Berthier was present likewise. "Picture to yourself," said
Rapp, "the astonishment, or rather confusion, of the poor Prince
when the bandage was removed from his eyes. He knew nothing of what
had been going on, and did not even suspect that the Emperor had yet
joined the army. When he understood that he was in the presence of
Napoleon he could not suppress an exclamation of surprise, which did
not escape the Emperor, and he ingenuously acknowledged that General
Mack had no idea he was before the walls of Ulm." Prince
Liechtenstein proposed to capitulate on condition that the garrison
of Ulm should be allowed to return into Austria. This proposal, in
the situation in which the garrison stood, Rapp said, made the
Emperor smile. "How can you expect," said Napoleon, "that I can
accede to such a proposition? What shall I gain by it? Eight days.
In eight days you will be in my power without any condition. Do you
suppose I am not acquainted with everything? . . You expect the
Russians? . . . At the nearest they are in Bohemia. Were I to
allow you to march out, what security can I have that you will not
join them, and afterwards fight against me? Your generals have
deceived me often enough, and I will no longer be duped. At Marengo
I was weak enough to allow the troops of Melas to march out of
Alessandria. He promised to treat for peace. What happened? Two
months after Moreau had to fight with the garrison of Alessandria.
Besides, this war is not an ordinary war. After the conduct of your
Government I am not bound to keep any terms with it. I have no
faith in its promises. You have attacked me. If I should agree to
what you ask, Mack would pledge his word, I know. But, even relying
on his good faith, would be he able to keep his promise? As far as
regards himself—yes; but as regards his army—no. If the Archduke
Ferdinand were still with you I could rely upon his word, because he
would be responsible for the conditions, and he would not disgrace
himself; but I know he has quitted Ulm and passed the Danube. I
know how to reach him, however."
Rapp said it was impossible to imagine the embarrassment of Prince
Liechtenstein whilst the Emperor was speaking. He, however,
somewhat regained his self-possession, and observed that, unless the
conditions which he proposed were granted the army would not
capitulate. "If that be the case," said Napoleon. "you may as well
go back to Mack, for I will never grant such conditions. Are you
jesting with me? Stay; here is the capitulation of Memingen—show
it to your General—let him surrender on the same conditions—I will
consent to no others. Your officers may return to Austria, but the
soldiers must be prisoners. Tell him to be speedy, for I have no
time to lose. The more he delays the worse he will render his own
condition and yours. To-morrow I shall have here the corps to which
Memingen capitulated, and then we shall see what is to be done.
Make Mack clearly understand that he has no alternative but to
conform to my will."
The imperious tones which Napoleon employed towards his enemies
almost always succeeded, and it produced the accustomed effect upon
Mack. On the same day that Prince Liechtenstein had been at our
headquarters Mack wrote to the Emperor, stating that he would not
have treated with any other on such terms; but that he yielded to
the ascendency of Napoleon's fortune; and on the following day
Berthier was sent into Ulm, from whence he returned with the
capitulation signed. Thus Napoleon was not mistaken respecting the
Caudine Forks of the Austrian army. The garrison of Ulm marched out
with what are called the honours of war, and were led prisoners into
France.—Bourrienne.]—
Napoleon, who was so violently irritated by any obstacle which opposed him, and who treated with so much hauteur everybody who ventured to resist his inflexible will, was no longer the same man when, as a conqueror, he received the vanquished generals at Ulm. He condoled with them on their misfortune; and this, I can affirm, was not the result of a feeling of pride concealed beneath a feigned generosity. Although he profited by their defeat he pitied them sincerely. How frequently has he observed to me, "How much to be pitied is a general on the day after a lost battle." He had himself experienced this misfortune when he was obliged to raise the siege of St. Jean d'Acre. At that moment he would, I believe, have strangled Djezzar; but if Djezzar had surrendered, he would have treated him with the same attention which he showed to Mack and the other generals of the garrison of Ulm. These generals were seventeen in number, and among them was Prince Liechtenstein. There were also General Klenau (Baron de Giulay), who had acquired considerable military reputation in the preceding wars, and General Fresnel, who stood in a more critical situation than his companions in misfortune, for he was a Frenchman, and an emigrant.
Rapp told me that it was really painful to see these generals. They bowed respectfully to the Emperor, having Mack at their head. They preserved a mournful silence, and Napoleon was the first to speak, which he did in the following terms: "Gentlemen, I feel sorry that such brave men as you are should be the victims of the follies of a Cabinet which cherishes insane projects, and which does not hesitate to commit the dignity of the Austrian nation by trafficking with the services of its generals. Your names are known to me—they are honourably known wherever you have fought. Examine the conduct of those who have committed you. What could be more iniquitous than to attack me without a declaration of war? Is it not criminal to bring foreign invasion upon a country? Is it not betraying Europe to introduce Asiatic barbarities into her disputes? If good policy had been followed the Aulic Council, instead of attacking me, would have sought my alliance in order to drive back the Russians to the north. The alliance which your Cabinet has formed will appear monstrous in history. It is the alliance of dogs, shepherds, and wolves against sheep—such a scheme could never have been planned in the mind of a statesman. It is fortunate for you that I have not been defeated in the unjust struggle to which I have been provoked; if I had, the Cabinet of Vienna would have soon perceived its error, for which, perhaps, it will yet one day pay dearly."
What a change fifteen days of success, crowned by the capture of Ulm, had made in affairs! At Hamburg I knew through my agents to what a degree of folly the hopes of Napoleon's enemies had risen before he began the campaign. The security of the Cabinet of Vienna was really inexplicable; not only did they not dream of the series of victories which made Napoleon master of all the Austrian monarchy, but the assistants of Drake and all the intriguers of that sort treated France already as a conquered country, and disposed of some of our provinces. In the excess of their folly, to only give one instance, they promised the town of Lyons to the King of Sardinia, to recompense him for the temporary occupation of Piedmont.
—[In the treaties and declarations (see Martens and Thiers, tome v.
p. 355) there is rather a tendency to sell the skin of the bear
before killing him.]—
While Napoleon flattered his prisoners at the expense of their Government he wished to express satisfaction at the conduct of his own army, and with this view he published a remarkable proclamation, which in some measure presented an abstract of all that had taken place since the opening of the campaign.
This proclamation was as follows:—
SOLDIERS OF THE GRAND ARMY—In a fortnight we have finished an
entire campaign. What we proposed to do has been done. We have
driven the Austrian troops from Bavaria, and restored our ally to
the sovereignty of his dominions.
That army, which, with equal presumption and imprudence, marched
upon our frontiers, is annihilated.
But what does this signify to England? She has gained her object.
We are no longer at Boulogne, and her subsidy will be neither more
nor less.
Of a hundred thousand men who composed that army, sixty thousand are
prisoners. They will replace our conscripts in the labours of
agriculture.
Two hundred pieces of cannon, the whole park of artillery, ninety
flags, and all their generals are in our power. Fifteen thousand
men only have escaped.
Soldiers! I announced to you the result of a great battle; but,
thanks to the ill-devised schemes of the enemy, I was enabled to
secure the wished-for result without incurring any danger, and, what
is unexampled in the history of nations, that result has been gained
at the sacrifice of scarcely fifteen hundred men killed and wounded.
Soldiers! this success is due to your unlimited confidence in your
Emperor, to your patience in enduring fatigues and privations of
every kind, and to your singular courage and intrepidity.
But we will not stop here. You are impatient to commence another
campaign!
The Russian army, which English gold has brought from the
extremities of the universe, shall experience the same fate as that
which we have just defeated.
In the conflict in which we are about to engage the honour of the
French infantry is especially concerned. We shall now see another
decision of the question which has already been determined in
Switzerland and Holland; namely, whether the French infantry is the
first or the second in Europe.
Among the Russians there are no generals in contending against whom
I can acquire any glory. All I wish is to obtain the victory with
the least possible bloodshed. My soldiers are, my children.
This proclamation always appeared to me a masterpiece of military eloquence. While he lavished praises on his troops, he excited their emulation by hinting that the Russians were capable of disputing with them the first rank among the infantry of Europe, and he concluded his address by calling them his children.
The second campaign, to which Napoleon alleged they so eagerly looked forward, speedily ensued, and hostilities were carried on with a degree of vigour which fired the enthusiasm of the army. Heaven knows what accounts were circulated of the Russians, who, as Bonaparte solemnly stated in his proclamation, had come from the extremity of the world. They were represented as half-naked savages, pillaging, destroying and burning wherever they went. It was even asserted that they were cannibals, and had been seen to eat children. In short, at that period was introduced the denomination of northern barbarians which has since been so generally applied to the Russians. Two days after the capitulation of Ulm Murat obtained the capitulation of Trochtelfingen from General Yarneck, and made 10,000 prisoners, so that, without counting killed and wounded, the Austrian army had sustained a diminution of 50,000 men after a campaign of twenty days. On the 27th of October the French army crossed the Inn, and thus penetrated into the Austrian territory. Salzburg and Brannan were immediately taken. The army of Italy, under the command of Massena, was also obtaining great advantages. On the 30th of October, that is to say, the very day on which the Grand Army took the above-mentioned fortresses, the army of Italy, having crossed the Adige, fought a sanguinary battle at Caldiero, and took 5000 Austrian prisoners.
In the extraordinary campaign, which has been distinguished by the name of "the Campaign of Austerlitz," the exploits of our troops succeeded each other with the rapidity of thought. I confess I was equally astonished and delighted when I received a note from Duroc, sent by an extraordinary courier, and commencing laconically with the words, "We are in Vienna; the Emperor is well."
Duroc's letter was dated the 13th November, and the words, "We are in Vienna," seemed to me the result of a dream. The capital of Austria, which from time immemorial had not been occupied by foreigners—the city which Sobieski had saved from Ottoman violence, had become the prey of the Imperial eagle of France, which, after a lapse of three centuries, avenged the humiliations formerly imposed upon Francis I. by the 'Aquila Grifagna' of Charles V. Duroc had left the Emperor before the camp of Boulogne was raised; his mission to Berlin being terminated, he rejoined the Emperor at Lintz.
—[As soon as Bonaparte became Emperor he constituted himself the
avenger of all the insults given to the sovereigns, whom he styled
his predecessors. All that related to the honour of France was
sacred to him. Thus he removed the column of Rosbach from the
Prussian territory.—Bourrienne.]—
Before I noticed the singular mission of M. Haugwitz to the Emperor Napoleon, and the result of that mission, which circumstances rendered diametrically the reverse of its object, I will relate what came to my knowledge respecting some other negotiations on the part of Austria, the evident intent of which was to retard Napoleon's progress, and thereby to dupe him. M. de Giulay, one of the generals included in the capitulation of Ulm, had returned home to acquaint his sovereign with the disastrous event. He did not conceal, either from the Emperor Francis or the Cabinet of Vienna, the destruction of the Austrian army, and the impossibility of arresting the rapid advance of the French. M. de Giulay was sent with a flag of truce to the headquarters of Napoleon, to assure him of the pacific intentions of the Emperor of Austria, and to solicit an armistice. The snare was too clumsy not to be immediately discovered by so crafty a man as Napoleon.
—[Metternich (tome ii. p. 346, compare French edition, tome ii.
p. 287) says, "Let us hold always the sword in one hand and the
olive branch in the other; always ready to negotiate, but only
negotiating while advancing." Here is Napoleons system.]—
He had always pretended a love for peace, though he was overjoyed at the idea of continuing a war so successfully commenced, and he directed General Giulay to assure the Emperor of Austria that he was not less anxious for peace than he, and that he was ready to treat for it, but without suspending the course of his operations. Bonaparte, indeed, could not, without a degree of imprudence of which he was incapable, consent to an armistice; for M. de Giulay, though entrusted with powers from Austria, had received none from Russia. Russia, therefore, might disavow the armistice and arrive in time to defend Vienna, the occupation of which was so important to the French army. The Russians, indeed, were advancing to oppose us, and the corps of our army, commanded by Mortier on the left bank of the Danube, experienced in the first engagement a check at Dirnstein, which not a little vexed the Emperor. This was the first reverse of fortune we had sustained throughout the campaign. It was trivial, to be sure, but the capture by the Russians of three French eagles, the first that had fallen into the hands of the enemy, was very mortifying to Napoleon, and caused him to prolong for some days his staff at St. Folten, where he then was.
The rapid occupation of Vienna was due to the successful temerity of Lannes and Murat, two men alike distinguished for courage and daring spirit. A bold artifice of these generals prevented the destruction of the Thabor bridge at Vienna, without which our army would have experienced considerable difficulty in penetrating into the Austrian capital. This act of courage and presence of mind, which had so great an influence on the events of the campaign, was described to me by Lannes, who told the story with an air of gaiety, unaccompanied by any self-complacency, and seemed rather pleased with the trick played upon the Austrians than proud of the brilliant action which had been performed. Bold enterprises were so natural to Lannes that he was frequently the only person who saw nothing extraordinary in his own exploits. Alas! what men were sacrificed to Napoleon's ambition!
The following is the story of the Bridge of Thabor as I heard it from Lannes:—
—[I was one day walking with Murat, on the right bank of the
Danube, and we observed on the left bank, which was occupied by the
Austrians, some works going on, the evident object of which was to
blow up the bridge on the approach of our troops. The fools had the
impudence to make these preparations under our very noses; but we
gave them a good lesson. Having arranged our plan, we returned to
give orders, and I entrusted the command of my column of grenadiers
to an officer on whose courage and intelligence I could rely. I
then returned to the bridge, accompanied by Murat and two or three
other officers. We advanced, unconcernedly, and entered into
conversation with the commander of a post in the middle of the
bridge. We spoke to him about an armistice which was to be speedily
concluded: While conversing with the Austrian officers we contrived
to make them turn their eyes towards the left bank, and then,
agreeably to the orders we had given, my column of grenadiers
advanced on the bridge. The Austrian cannoneers, on the left bank,
seeing their officers in the midst of us, did not dare to fire, and
my column advanced at a quick step. Murat and I, at the head of it,
gained the left bank. All the combustibles prepared for blowing up
the bridge were thrown into the river, and my men took possession of
the batteries erected for the defence of the bridge head. The poor
devils of Austrian officers were perfectly astounded when I told
them they were my prisoners.]—
Such, as well as I can recollect, was the account given by Lannes, who laughed immoderately in describing the consternation of the Austrian officers when they discovered the trick that had been played upon them. When Lannes performed this exploit he had little idea of the important consequences which would attend, it. He had not only secured to the remainder of the French army a sure and easy entrance to Vienna, but, without being aware of it, he created an insurmountable impediment to the junction of the Russian army with the Austrian corps, commanded by Prince Charles, who, being pressed by Massena, hastily advanced into the heart of the Hereditary States, where he fully expected a great battle would take place.
As soon as the corps of Murat and Lannes had taken possession of Vienna the Emperor ordered all the divisions of the army to march upon that capital.
—[The story to told in much the same way in Theirs (tome vi, p.
260), Rupp (p. 57), and Savory (tome ii. p. 162), but as Erreurs
(tome i. p. 814) points out, Bourrienne makes an odd mistake in
believing the Thabor Bridge gave the French access to Vienna. The
capital is on the right bank, and was already in their power. The
possession of the bridge enabled them to pass over to the left bank,
and to advance towards Austerlitz before the Archduke Charles,
coming from Italy, could make his junction with the allied army.
See plan 48 of Thiers' Atlas, or 58 of Alison's. The immediate
result of the success of this rather doubtful artifice would have
been the destruction of the corps of Kutusoff; but Murat in his turn
was deceived by Bagration into belief in an armistice. In fact,
both sides at this time fell into curious errors.]—
Napoleon established his headquarters at Schoenbrunn, where he planned his operations for compelling the corps of Prince Charles to retire to Hungary, and also for advancing his own forces to meet the Russians. Murat and Lannes always commanded the advanced guard during the forced marches ordered by Napoleon, which were executed in a way truly miraculous.
To keep up the appearance of wishing to conclude peace as soon as reasonable propositions should be made to him, Napoleon sent for his Minister for foreign Affairs, who speedily arrived at Vienna, and General Savary was sent on a mission to the Emperor Alexander. The details of this mission I have learned only from the account of it given by the Duc de Rovigo in his apologetic Memoirs. In spite of the Duke's eagerness to induce a belief in Napoleon's pacific disposition, the very facts on which he supports his argument lead to the contrary conclusion. Napoleon wished to dictate his conditions before the issue of a battle the success of which might appear doubtful to the young Emperor of Russia, and these conditions were such as he might impose when victory should be declared in favour of our eagles. It must be clear to every reflecting person that by always proposing what he knew could not be honourably acceded to, he kept up the appearance of being a pacificator, while at the same time he ensured to himself the pleasure of carrying on the war.