1799.
Murat and Moarad Bey at the Natron Lakes—Bonaparte's departure for
the Pyramids—Sudden appearance of an Arab messenger—News of
the landing of the Turks at Aboukir—Bonaparte marches against
them—They are immediately attacked and destroyed in the battle of
Aboukir—Interchange of communication with the English—Sudden
determination to return to Europe—Outfit of two frigates—
Bonaparte's dissimulation—His pretended journey to the Delta—
Generous behaviour of Lanusee—Bonaparte's artifice—His bad
treatment of General Kl閎er.
Bonaparte had hardly set foot in Cairo when he was informed that the brave and indefatigable Mourad Bey was descending by the Fayoum, in order to form a junction with reinforcements which had been for some time past collected in the Bohahire'h. In all probability this movement of Mourad Bey was the result of news he had received respecting plans formed at Constantinople, and the landing which took place a short time after in the roads of Aboukir. Mourad had selected the Natron Lakes for his place of rendezvous. To these lakes Murat was despatched. The Bey no sooner got notice of Murat's presence than he determined to retreat and to proceed by the desert to Gizeh and the great Pyramids. I certainly never heard, until I returned to France, that Mourad had ascended to the summit of the great Pyramid for the purpose of passing his time in contemplating Cairo!
Napoleon said at St. Helena that Murat might have taken Mourad Bey had the latter remained four-and-twenty hours longer in the Natron Lakes. Now the fact is, that as soon as the Bey heard of Murat's arrival he was off. The Arabian spies were far more serviceable to our enemies than to us; we had not, indeed, a single friend in Egypt. Mourad Bey, on being informed by the Arabs, who acted as couriers for him, that General Desaix was despatching a column from the south of Egypt against him, that the General-in-Chief was also about to follow his footsteps along the frontier of Gizeh, and that the Natron Lakes and the Bohahire'h were occupied by forces superior to his own, retired into Fayoum.
Bonaparte attached great importance to the destruction of Mourad, whom he looked upon as the bravest, the most active, and most dangerous of his enemies in Egypt. As all accounts concurred in stating that Mourad, supported by the Arabs, was hovering about the skirts of the desert of the province of Gizeh, Bonaparte proceeded to the Pyramids, there to direct different corps against that able and dangerous partisan. He, indeed, reckoned him so redoubtable that he wrote to Murat, saying he wished fortune might reserve for him the honour of putting the seal on the conquest of Egypt by the destruction of this opponent.
On the 14th of July Bonaparte left Cairo for the Pyramids. He intended spending three or four days in examining the ruins of the ancient necropolis of Memphis; but he was suddenly obliged to alter his plan. This journey to the Pyramids, occasioned by the course of war, has given an opportunity for the invention of a little piece of romance. Some ingenious people have related that Bonaparte gave audiences to the mufti and ulemas, and that on entering one of the great Pyramids he cried out, "Glory to Allah! God only is God, and Mahomet is his prophet!" Now the fact is, that Bonaparte never even entered the great Pyramid. He never had any thought of entering it:—I certainly should have accompanied him had he done so for I never quitted his side a single moment in the desert. He caused some person to enter into one of the great Pyramids while he remained outside, and received from them, on their return, an account of what they had seen. In other words, they informed him there was nothing to be seen!
On the evening of the 15th of July, while we were taking a walk, we perceived, on the road leading from Alexandria, an Arab riding up to us in all haste. He brought to the General-in-Chief a despatch from General Marmont, who was entrusted with the command of Alexandria, and who had conducted himself so well, especially during the dreadful ravages of the plague, that he had gained the unqualified approbation of Bonaparte. The Turks had landed on the 11th of July at Aboukir, under the escort and protection of English ships of war. The news of the landing of from fifteen to sixteen thousand men did not surprise Bonaparte, who had for some time expected it. It was not so, however, with the generals most in his favor, whose apprehensions, for reasons which may be conjectured, he had endeavoured to calm. He had even written to Marmont, who, being in the most exposed situation, had the more reason to be vigilant, in these terms:
The army which was to have appeared before Alexandria, and which
left Constantinople on the 1st of the Ramadhan, has been destroyed
under the walls of Acre. If, however, that mad Englishman (Smith)
has embarked the remains of that army in order to convey them to
Aboukir, I do not believe there can be more than 2000 men.
He wrote in the following strain to General Dugua, who had the command of Cairo:
The English Commander, who has summoned Damietta, is a madman. The
combined army they speak of has been destroyed before Acre, where it
arrived a fortnight before we left that place.
As soon as he arrived at Cairo, in a letter he despatched to Desaix, he said:
The time has now arrived when disembarkations have become
practicable. I shall lose no time in getting ready. The
probabilities, however, are, that none will take place this year.
What other language could he hold, when he had proclaimed when after the raising of the siege of Acre, that he had destroyed those 15,000 men who two months after landed at Aboukir?
No sooner had Bonaparte perused the contents of Marmont's letter than he retired into his tent and dictated to me, until three in the morning, his orders for the departure of the troops, and for the routes he wished to be pursued during his absence by the troops who should remain in the interior. At this moment I observed in him the development of that vigorous character of mind which was excited by obstacles until he overcame them—that celerity of thought which foresaw everything. He was all action, and never for a moment hesitated. On the 16th of July, at four in the morning, he was on horseback and the army in full march. I cannot help doing justice to the presence of mind, promptitude of decision, and rapidity of execution which at this period of his life never deserted him on great occasions.
We reached Ouardan, to the north of Gizeh, on the evening of the 16th; on the 19th we arrived at Rahmalianie'h, and on the 23d at Alexandria, where every preparation was made for that memorable battle which, though it did not repair the immense losses and fatal consequences of the naval conflict of the same name, will always recall to the memory of Frenchmen one of the most brilliant achievements of their arms.
—[As M. de Bourrienne gives no details of the battle, the
following extract from the Duc de Rovigo's Memoirs, tome i, p. 167,
will supply the deficiency:
"General Bonaparte left Cairo in the utmost haste to place himself
at the head of the troops which he had ordered to quit their
cantonments and march down to the coast.
"Whilst the General was making these arrangements and coming in
person from Cairo, the troops on board the Turkish fleet had
effected a landing and taken possession of the fort of Aboukir, and
of a redoubt placed behind the village of that name which ought to
have been put into a state of defence six months before, but had
been completely neglected.
"The Turks had nearly destroyed the weak garrisons that occupied
those two military points when General Marmont (who commanded at
Alexandria) came to their relief. This general, seeing the two
posts in the power of the Turks, returned to shut himself up in
Alexandria, where he would probably have been blockaded by the
Turkish army had it not been for the arrival of General Bonaparte
with his forces, who was very angry when he saw that the fort and
redoubt had been taken; but he did not blame Marmont for retreating
to Alexandria with the forces at his disposal.
"General Bonaparte arrived at midnight with his guides and the
remaining part of his army, and ordered the Turks to be attacked the
next morning. In this battle, as in the preceding ones, the attack,
the encounter, and the rout were occurrences of a moment, and the
result of a single movement on the part of our troops. The whole
Turkish army plunged into the sea to regain its ships, leaving
behind them everything they had brought on shore.
"Whilst this event was occurring on the seashore a pasha had left
the field of battle with a corps of about 3000 men in order to throw
himself into the fort of Aboukir. They soon felt the extremities
of thirst, which compelled them, after the lapse of a few days, to
surrender unconditionally to General Menou, who was left to close
the operations connected with the recently defeated Turkish army."]
After the battle, which took place on the 25th of July, Bonaparte sent a flag of truce on board the English Admiral's ship. Our intercourse was full of politeness, such as might be expected in the communications of the people of two civilised nations. The English Admiral gave the flag of truce some presents in exchange for some we sent, and likewise a copy of the French Gazette of Frankfort, dated 10th of June 1799. For ten months we had received no news from France. Bonaparte glanced over this journal with an eagerness which may easily be conceived.
—[The French, on their return from St. Jean d'Acre were totally
ignorant of all that had taken place in Europe for several months.
Napoleon, eager to obtain intelligence, sent a flag of truce on
board the Turkish admiral's ship, under the pretence of treating for
the ransom of the prisoners taken at Aboukir, not doubting but the
envoy would be stopped by Sir Sidney Smith, who carefully prevented
all direct communication between the French and the Turks.
Accordingly the French flag of truce received directions from Sir
Sidney to go on board his ship. He experienced the handsomest
treatment; and the English commander having, among other things,
ascertained that the disasters of Italy were quite unknown to
Napoleon, indulged in the malicious pleasure of sending him a file
of newspapers. Napoleon spent the whole night in his tent perusing
the papers; and he came to the determination of immediately
proceeding to Europe to repair the disasters of France; and if
possible, to save her from destruction (Memorial de Sainte Helene)].
"Heavens!" said he to me, "my presentiment is verified: the fools have lost Italy. All the fruits of our victories are gone! I must leave Egypt!"
He sent for Berthier, to whom he communicated the news, adding that things were going on very badly in France—that he wished to return home—that he (Berthier) should go along with him, and that, for the present, only he, Gantheaume, and I were in the secret. He recommended Berthier to be prudent, not to betray any symptoms of joy, nor to purchase or sell anything, and concluded by assuring him that he depended on him. "I can answer," said he, "for myself and for Bourrienne." Berthier promised to be secret, and he kept his word. He had had enough of Egypt, and he so ardently longed to return to France, that there was little reason to fear he would disappoint himself by any indiscretion.
Gantheaume arrived, and Bonaparte gave him orders to fit out the two frigates, the 'Muiron' and the 'Carr鑢e', and the two small vessels, the 'Revanche' and the 'Fortune', with a two months' supply of provisions for from four to five hundred men. He enjoined his secrecy as to the object of these preparations, and desired him to act with such circumspection that the English cruisers might have no knowledge of what was going on. He afterwards arranged with Gantheaume the course he wished to take. No details escaped his attention.
Bonaparte concealed his preparations with much care, but still some vague rumours crept abroad. General Dugua, the commandant of Cairo, whom he had just left for the purpose of embarking, wrote to him on the 18th of August to the following effect:
I have this moment heard that it is reported at the Institute you
are about to return to France, taking with you Monge, Berthollet,
Berthier, Lannes, and Murat. This news has spread like lightning
through the city, and I should not be at all surprised if it produce
an unfavourable effect, which, however, I hope you will obviate.
Bonaparte embarked five days after the receipt of Dugua's letter, and, as may be supposed, without replying to it.
On the 18th of August he wrote to the divan of Cairo as follows:
I set out to-morrow for Menouf, whence I intend to make various
excursions in the Delta, in order that I may myself witness the acts
of oppression which are committed there, and acquire some knowledge
of the people.
He told the army but half the truth:
The news from Europe (said he) has determined me to proceed to
France. I leave the command of the army to General Kl閎er. The
army shall hear from me forthwith. At present I can say no more.
It costs me much pain to quit troops to whom I am so strongly
attached. But my absence will be but temporary, and the general I
leave in command has the confidence of the Government as well as
mine.
I have now shown the true cause of General Bonaparte's departure for Europe. This circumstance, in itself perfectly natural, has been the subject of the most ridiculous conjectures to those who always wish to assign extraordinary causes for simple events. There is no truth whatever in the assertion of his having planned his departure before the battle of Aboukir. Such an idea never crossed his mind. He had no thought whatever of his departure for France when he made the journey to the Pyramids, nor even when he received the news of the landing of the Anglo-Turkish force.
At the end of December 1798 Bonaparte thus wrote to the Directory: "We are without any news from France. No courier has arrived since the month of June."
Some writers have stated that we received news by the way of Tunis, Algiers, or Morocco; but there is no contradicting a positive fact. At that period I had been with Bonaparte more than two years, and during that time not a single despatch on any occasion arrived of the contents of which I was ignorant. How then should the news alluded to have escaped me?
—[Details on the question of the correspondence of Napoleon with
France while he was to Egypt will be found in Colonel Iung's work,
Lucien Bonaparte (Paris. Charpentier, 1882), tome i. pp. 251-274.
It seems most probable that Napoleon was in occasional communication
with his family and with some of the Directors by way of Tunis and
Tripoli. It would not be his interest to let his army or perhaps
even Bourrienne know of the disasters in Italy till he found that
they were sure to hear of them through the English. This would
explain his affected ignorance till such a late date. On the 11th
of April Barras received a despatch by which Napoleon stated his
intention of returning to France if the news brought by Hamelin was
confirmed. On the 26th of May 1799 three of the Directors, Barras,
Rewbell, and La R関elli鑢e-Lepeaux, wrote to Napoleon that Admiral
Bruix had been ordered to attempt every means of bringing back his
army. On the 15th of July Napoleon seems to have received this and
other letters. On the 20th of July he warns Admiral Gantheaume to
be ready to start. On the 11th of September the Directors formally
approved the recall of the army from Egypt. Thus at the time
Napoleon landed in France (on the 8th October), his intended return
had been long known to and approved by the majority of the
Directors, and had at last been formally ordered by the Directory.
At the most he anticipated the order. He cannot be said to have
deserted his post. Lantrey (tome i. p. 411) remarks that the
existence and receipt of the letter from Joseph denied by Bourrienne
is proved by Miot (the commissary, the brother of Miot de Melito)
and by Joseph himself. Talleyrand thanks the French Consul at
Tripoli for sending news from Egypt, and for letting Bonaparte know
what passed in Europe. See also Ragusa (Marmont), tome i. p. 441,
writing on 24th December 1798: "I have found an Arab of whom I am
sure, and who shall start to-morrow for Derne. . . . This means
can be used to send a letter to Tripoli, for boats often go there."]
Almost all those who endeavour to avert from Bonaparte the reproach of desertion quote a letter from the Directory, dated the 26th of May 1799. This letter may certainly have been written, but it never reached its destination. Why then should it be put upon record?
The circumstance I have stated above determined the resolution of Bonaparte, and made him look upon Egypt as an exhausted field of glory, which it was high time he had quitted, to play another part in France. On his departure from Europe Bonaparte felt that his reputation was tottering. He wished to do something to raise up his glory, and to fix upon him the attention of the world. This object he had in great part accomplished; for, in spite of serious disasters, the French flag waved over the cataracts of the Nile and the ruins of Memphis, and the battles of the Pyramids, and Aboukir were calculated in no small degree to dazzle the imagination. Cairo and Alexandria too were ours. Finding that the glory of his arms no longer supported the feeble power of the Directory, he was anxious to see whether he could not share it, or appropriate it to himself.
A great deal has been said about letters and secret communications from the Directory, but Bonaparte needed no such thing. He could do what he pleased: there was no power to check him; such had been the nature of his arrangements on leaving France. He followed only the dictates of his own will, and probably, had not the fleet been destroyed, he would have departed from Egypt much sooner. To will and to do were with him one and the same thing. The latitude he enjoyed was the result of his verbal agreement with the Directory, whose instructions and plans he did not wish should impede his operations.
Bonaparte left Alexandria on the 5th of August, and on the 10th arrived at Cairo. He at first circulated the report of a journey to Upper Egypt. This seemed so much the more reasonable, as he had really entertained that design before he went to the Pyramids, and the fact was known to the army and the inhabitants of Cairo. Up to this time our secret had been studiously kept. However, General Lanusse, the commandant at Menouf, where we arrived on the 20th of August, suspected it. "You are going to France," said he to me. My negative reply confirmed his suspicion. This almost induced me to believe the General-in-Chief had been the first to make the disclosure. General Lanusse, though he envied our good fortune, made no complaints. He expressed his sincere wishes for our prosperous voyage, but never opened his mouth on the subject to any one.
On the 21st of August we reached the wells of Birkett. The Arabs had rendered the water unfit for use, but the General-in-Chief was resolved to quench his thirst, and for this purpose squeezed the juice of several lemons into a glass of the water; but he could not swallow it without holding his nose and exhibiting strong feelings of disgust.
The next day we reached Alexandria, where the General informed all those, who had accompanied him from Cairo that France was their destination. At this announcement joy was pictured in every countenance.
General Kl閎er, to whose command Bonaparte had resigned the army, was invited to come from Damietta to Rosetta to confer with the General-in-Chief on affairs of extreme importance. Bonaparte, in making an appointment which he never intended to keep, hoped to escape the unwelcome freedom of Kl閎er's reproaches. He afterwards wrote to him all he had to say; and the cause he assigned for not keeping his appointment was, that his fear of being observed by the English cruisers had forced him to depart three days earlier than he intended. But when he wrote Bonaparte well knew that he would be at sea before Kl閎er could receive his letter. Kl閎er, in his letter to the Directory, complained bitterly of this deception. The singular fate that befell this letter will be seen by and by.