_ We will now show of what numbers and of what sort of people a
government ought to consist, that the state may be happy and well
administered. As there are two particulars on which the excellence and
perfection of everything depend, one of these is, that the object and
end proposed should be proper; the other, that the means to accomplish
it should be adapted to that purpose; for it may happen that these may
either agree or disagree with each other; for the end we propose may
be good, but in taking the means to obtain it we may err; at other
times we may have the right and proper means in our power, but the end
may be bad, and sometimes we may mistake in both; as in the art of
medicine the physician does not sometimes know in what situation the
body ought to be, to be healthy; nor what to do to procure the end he
aims at. In every art and science, therefore, we should be master of
this knowledge, namely, the proper end, and the means to obtain it.
Now it is evident that all persons are desirous to live well and be
happy; but that some have the means thereof in their own power, others
not; and this either through nature [1332a] or fortune; for many
ingredients are necessary to a happy life; but fewer to those who are
of a good than to those who are of a bad disposition. There are others
who continually have the means of happiness in their own power, but do
not rightly apply them. Since we propose to inquire what government is
best, namely, that by which a state may be best administered, and that
state is best administered where the people are the happiest, it is
evident that happiness is a thing we should not be unacquainted with.
Now, I have already said in my treatise on Morals (if I may here make
any use of what I have there shown), that happiness consists in the
energy and perfect practice of virtue; and this not relatively, but
simply; I mean by relatively, what is necessary in some certain
circumstances; by simply, what is good and fair in itself: of the
first sort are just punishments, and restraints in a just cause; for
they arise from virtue and are necessary, and on that account are
virtuous; though it is more desirable that neither any state nor any
individual should stand in need of them; but those actions which are
intended either to procure honour or wealth are simply good; the
others eligible only to remove an evil; these, on the contrary, are
the foundation and means of relative good. A worthy man indeed will
bear poverty, disease, and other unfortunate accidents with a noble
mind; but happiness consists in the contrary to these (now we have
already determined in our treatise on Morals, that he is a man of
worth who considers what is good because it is virtuous as what is
simply good; it is evident, therefore, that all the actions of such a
one must be worthy and simply good): this has led some persons to
conclude, that the cause of happiness was external goods; which would
be as if any one should suppose that the playing well upon the lyre
was owing to the instrument, and not to the art. It necessarily
follows from what has been said, that some things should be ready at
hand and others procured by the legislator; for which reason in
founding a city we earnestly wish that there may be plenty of those
things which are supposed to be under the dominion of fortune (for
some things we admit her to be mistress over); but for a state to be
worthy and great is not only the work of fortune but of knowledge and
judgment also. But for a state to be worthy it is necessary that those
citizens which are in the administration should be worthy also; but as
in our city every citizen is to be so, we must consider how this may
be accomplished; for if this is what every one could be, and not some
individuals only, it would be more desirable; for then it would
follow, that what might be done by one might be done by all. Men are
worthy and good three ways; by nature, by custom, by reason. In the
first place, a man ought to be born a man, and not any other animal;
that is to say, he ought to have both a body and soul; but it avails
not to be only born [1332b] with some things, for custom makes great
alterations; for there are some things in nature capable of alteration
either way which are fixed by custom, either for the better or the
worse. Now, other animals live chiefly a life of nature; and in very
few things according to custom; but man lives according to reason
also, which he alone is endowed with; wherefore he ought to make all
these accord with each other; for if men followed reason, and were
persuaded that it was best to obey her, they would act in many
respects contrary to nature and custom. What men ought naturally to
be, to make good members of a community, I have already determined;
the rest of this discourse therefore shall be upon education; for some
things are acquired by habit, others by hearing them. _