_ Now the foundation of a democratical state is liberty, and people have
been accustomed to say this as if here only liberty was to be found;
for they affirm that this is the end proposed by every democracy. But
one part of liberty is to govern and be governed alternately; for,
according to democratical justice, equality is measured by numbers,
and not by worth: and this being just, it is necessary that the
supreme power should be vested in the people at large; and that what
the majority determine should be final: so that in a democracy the
poor ought to have more power than the rich, as being the greater
number; for this is one mark of liberty which all framers of a
democracy lay down as a criterion of that state; another is, to live
as every one likes; for this, they say, is a right which liberty
gives, since he is a slave who must live as he likes not. This, then,
is another criterion of a democracy. Hence arises the claim to be
under no command whatsoever to any one, upon any account, any
otherwise than by rotation, and that just as far only as that person
is, in his turn, under his also. This also is conducive to that
equality which liberty demands. These things being premised, and such
being the government, it follows that such rules as the following
should be observed in it, that all the magistrates should be chosen
out of all the people, and all to command each, and each in his turn
all: that all the magistrates should be chosen by lot, except to those
offices only which required some particular knowledge and skill: that
no census, or a very small one, should be required to qualify a man
for any office: that none should be in the same employment twice, or
very few, and very seldom, except in the army: that all their
appointments should be limited to a very short time, or at least as
many as possible: that the whole community should be qualified to
judge in all causes whatsoever, let the object be ever so extensive,
ever so interesting, or of ever so high a nature; as at Athens, where
the people at large judge the magistrates when they come out of
office, and decide concerning public affairs as well as private
contracts: that the supreme power should be in the public assembly;
and that no magistrate should be allowed any discretionary power but
in a few instances, and of no consequence to public business. Of all
magistrates a senate is best suited to a democracy, where the whole
community is not paid for giving their attendance; for in that case
it; loses its power; for then the people will bring all causes before
them, by appeal, as we have already mentioned in a former book. In the
next place, there should, if possible, be a fund to pay all the
citizens--who have any share in the management of public affairs,
either as members of the assembly, judges, and magistrates; but if
this cannot be done, at least the magistrates, the judges the
senators, and members of the supreme assembly, and also those officers
who are obliged to eat at a common table ought to be paid. Moreover,
as an oligarchy is said to be a government of men of family, fortune,
and education; so, on the contrary, a democracy is a government in the
hands of men of no birth, indigent circumstances, and mechanical
employments. In this state also no office [1318a] should be for life;
and, if any such should remain after the government has been long
changed into a democracy, they should endeavour by degrees to diminish
the power; and also elect by lot instead of vote. These things, then,
appertain to all democracies; namely, to be established on that
principle of justice which is homogeneous to those governments; that
is, that all the members of the state, by number, should enjoy an
equality, which seems chiefly to constitute a democracy, or government
of the people: for it seems perfectly equal that the rich should have
no more share in the government than the poor, nor be alone in power;
but that all should be equal, according to number; for thus, they
think, the equality and liberty of the state best preserved. _