_ There are three qualifications necessary for those who fill the first
departments in government; first of all, an affection for the
established constitution; second place, abilities every way completely
equal to the business of their office; in the third, virtue and
justice correspondent to the nature of that particular state they are
placed in; for if justice is not the same in all states, it is evident
that there must be different species thereof. There may be some doubt,
when all these qualifications do not in the same persons, in what
manner the choice shall be made; as for instance, suppose that one
person is an accomplished general, but a bad man and no friend to the
[1309b] constitution; another is just and a friend to it, which shall
one prefer? we should then consider of two qualities, which of them
the generality possess in a greater degree, which in a less; for which
reason in the choice of a general we should regard his courage more
than his virtue as the more uncommon quality; as there are fewer
capable of conducting an army than there are good men: but, to protect
the state or manage the finances, the contrary rule should be
followed; for these require greater virtue than the generality are
possessed of, but only that knowledge which is common to all. It may
be asked, if a man has abilities equal to his appointment in the
state, and is affectionate to the constitution, what occasion is there
for being virtuous, since these two things alone are sufficient to
enable him to be useful to the public? it is, because those who
possess those qualities are often deficient in prudence; for, as they
often neglect their own affairs, though they know them and love
themselves, so nothing will prevent their serving the public in the
same manner. In short, whatsoever the laws contain which we allow to
be useful to the state contributes to its preservation: but its first
and principal support is (as has been often insisted upon) to have the
number of those who desire to preserve it greater than those who wish
to destroy it. Above all things that ought not to be forgotten which
many governments now corrupted neglect; namely, to preserve a mean.
For many things seemingly favourable to a democracy destroy a
democracy, and many things seemingly favourable to an oligarchy
destroy an oligarchy. Those who think this the only virtue extend it
to excess, not considering that as a nose which varies a little from
perfect straightness, either towards a hook nose or a flat one, may
yet be beautiful and agreeable to look at; but if this particularity
is extended beyond measure, first of all the properties of the part is
lost, but at last it can hardly be admitted to be a nose at all, on
account of the excess of the rise or sinking: thus it is with other
parts of the human body; so also the same thing is true with respect
to states; for both an oligarchy and a democracy may something vary
from their most perfect form and yet be well constituted; but if any
one endeavours to extend either of them too far, at first he will make
the government the worse for it, but at last there will be no
government at all remaining. The lawgiver and the politician therefore
should know well what preserves and what destroys a democracy or an
oligarchy, for neither the one nor the other can possibly continue
without rich and poor: but that whenever an entire equality of
circumstances [1310a] prevails, the state must necessarily become of
another form; so that those who destroy these laws, which authorise an
inequality in property, destroy the government. It is also an error in
democracies for the demagogues to endeavour to make the common people
superior to the laws; and thus by setting them at variance with the
rich, dividing one city into two; whereas they ought rather to speak
in favour of the rich. In oligarchies, on the contrary, it is wrong to
support those who are in administration against the people. The oaths
also which they take in an oligarchy ought to be contrary to what they
now are; for, at present, in some places they swear, "I will be
adverse to the common people, and contrive all I can against them;"
whereas they ought rather to suppose and pretend the contrary;
expressing in their oaths, that they will not injure the people. But
of all things which I have mentioned, that which contributes most to
preserve the state is, what is now most despised, to educate your
children for the state; for the most useful laws, and most approved by
every statesman, will be of no service if the citizens are not
accustomed to and brought up in the principles of the constitution; of
a democracy, if that is by law established; of an oligarchy, if that
is; for if there are bad morals in one man, there are in the city. But
to educate a child fit for the state, it must not be done in the
manner which would please either those who have the power in an
oligarchy or those who desire a democracy, but so as they may be able
to conduct either of these forms of governments. But now the children
of the magistrates in an oligarchy are brought up too delicately, and
the children of the poor hardy with exercise and labour; so that they
are both desirous of and able to promote innovations. In democracies
of the purest form they pursue a method which is contrary to their
welfare; the reason of which is, that they define liberty wrong: now,
there are two things which seem to be the objects of a democracy, that
the people in general should possess the supreme power, and all enjoy
freedom; for that which is just seems to be equal, and what the people
think equal, that is a law: now, their freedom and equality consists
in every one's doing what they please: that is in such a democracy
every one may live as he likes; "as his inclination guides," in the
words of Euripides: but this is wrong, for no one ought to think it
slavery to live in subjection to government, but protection. Thus I
have mentioned the causes of corruption in different states, and the
means of their preservation. _