'Tis a pleasant imagination to fancy a mind exactly balanced betwixt two equal desires: for, doubtless, it can never pitch upon either, forasmuch as the choice and application would manifest an inequality of esteem; and were we set betwixt the bottle and the ham, with an equal appetite to drink and eat, there would doubtless be no remedy, but we must die of thirst and hunger. To provide against this inconvenience, the Stoics, when they are asked whence the election in the soul of two indifferent things proceeds, and that makes us, out of a great number of crowns, rather take one than another, they being all alike, and there being no reason to incline us to such a preference, make answer, that this movement of the soul is extraordinary and irregular, entering into us by a foreign, accidental, and fortuitous impulse. It might rather, methinks, he said, that nothing presents itself to us wherein there is not some difference, how little soever; and that, either by the sight or touch, there is always some choice that, though it be imperceptibly, tempts and attracts us; so, whoever shall presuppose a packthread equally strong throughout, it is utterly impossible it should break; for, where will you have the breaking to begin? and that it should break altogether is not in nature. Whoever, also, should hereunto join the geometrical propositions that, by the certainty of their demonstrations, conclude the contained to be greater than the containing, the centre to be as great as its circumference, and that find out two lines incessantly approaching each other, which yet can never meet, and the philosopher's stone, and the quadrature of the circle, where the reason and the effect are so opposite, might, peradventure, find some argument to second this bold saying of Pliny:
       "Solum certum nihil esse certi,
       et homine nihil miserius ant superbius."
       ["It is only certain that there is nothing certain,
       and that nothing is more miserable or more proud than man."
       --Nat. Hist., ii. 7.]
       [The end]
       Montaigne's essay: That Our Mind Hinders Itself

Against Idleness
All Things Have Their Season
The Ceremony Of The Interview Of Princes
A Consideration Upon Cicero
Cowardice The Mother Of Cruelty
A Custom Of The Isle Of Cea
Defence Of Seneca And Plutarch
The Letters Of Montaigne
Nine And Twenty Sonnets Of Estienne De La Boitie
Not To Communicate A Man's Honour
Not To Counterfeit Being Sick
Observation On The Means To Carry On A War According To Julius Caesar
Of A Monstrous Child
Of A Saying Of Caesar
Of Age
Of Ancient Customs
Of Anger
Of Books
Of Cannibals
Of Cato The Younger
Of Coaches
Of Conscience
Of Constancy
Of Cripples
Of Cruelty
Of Custom, And That We Should Not Easily Change A Law Received
Of Democritus And Heraclitus
Of Diversion
Of Drunkenness
Of Experience
Of Fear
Of Friendship
Of Giving The Lie
Of Glory
Of Idleness
Of Ill Means Employed To A Good End
Of Judging Of The Death Of Another
Of Liars
Of Liberty Of Conscience
Of Managing the Will
Of Moderation
Of Names
Of One Defect In Our Government
Of Pedantry
Of Physiognomy
Of Posting
Of Prayers
Of Presumption
Of Profit And Honesty
Of Prognostications
Of Quick Or Slow Speech
Of Recompenses Of Honour
Of Repentance
Of Sleep
Of Smells
Of Solitude
Of Sorrow
Of Sumptuary Laws
Of The Affection Of Fathers To Their Children
Of The Arms Of The Parthians
Of the Art of Conference
Of The Battle Of Dreux
Of The Custom Of Wearing Clothes
Of The Education Of Children
Of The Force Of Imagination
Of The Inconstancy Of Our Actions
Of The Inconvenience Of Greatness
Of The Inequality Amongst Us
Of The Most Excellent Men
Of The Parsimony Of The Ancients
Of The Punishment Of Cowardice
Of The Resemblance Of Children To Their Fathers
Of The Roman Grandeur
Of The Uncertainty Of Our Judgment
Of The Vanity Of Words
Of Three Commerces
Of Three Good Women
Of Thumbs
Of Vain Subtleties
Of Vanity
Of Virtue
Of War Horses, Or Destriers
A Proceeding Of Some Ambassadors
The Story Of Spurina
That A Man Is Soberly To Judge Of The Divine Ordinances
That Fortune Is Oftentimes Observed To Act By The Rule Of Reason
That It Is Folly To Measure Truth And Error By Our Own Capacity
That Men Are Justly Punished For Being Obstinate In The Defence Of A Fort
That Men Are Not To Judge Of Our Happiness Till After Death
That Men By Various Ways Arrive At The Same End
That Our Affections Carry Themselves Beyond Us
That Our Desires Are Augmented By Difficulty
That Our Mind Hinders Itself
That The Hour Of Parley Is Dangerous
That The Intention Is Judge Of Our Actions
That The Profit Of One Man Is The Damage Of Another
That The Relish For Good And Evil Depends In Great Measure Upon The Opinion
That The Soul Expends Its Passions Upon False Objects, Where The True Are Wantin
That To Study Philosophy Is To Learn To Die
That We Are To Avoid Pleasures, Even At The Expense Of Life
That We Laugh And Cry For The Same Thing
That We Taste Nothing Pure
To-Morrow's A New Day
Upon Some Verses Of Virgil
Use Makes Perfect
Various Events From The Same Counsel
Whether The Governor Of A Place Besieged Ought Himself To Go Out To Parley