(Translated by Charles Cotton)
       The law of resolution and constancy does not imply that we ought not, as much as in us lies, to decline and secure ourselves from the mischiefs and inconveniences that threaten us; nor, consequently, that we shall not fear lest they should surprise us: on the contrary, all decent and honest ways and means of securing ourselves from harms, are not only permitted, but, moreover, commendable, and the business of constancy chiefly is, bravely to stand to, and stoutly to suffer those inconveniences which are not possibly to be avoided. So that there is no supple motion of body, nor any movement in the handling of arms, how irregular or ungraceful soever, that we need condemn, if they serve to protect us from the blow that is made against us.
       Several very warlike nations have made use of a retreating and flying way of fight as a thing of singular advantage, and, by so doing, have made their backs more dangerous to their enemies than their faces. Of which kind of fighting the Turks still retain something in their practice of arms; and Socrates, in Plato, laughs at Laches, who had defined fortitude to be a standing firm in the ranks against the enemy. "What!" says he, "would it, then, be a reputed cowardice to overcome them by giving ground?" urging, at the same time, the authority of Homer, who commends in AEneas the science of flight. And whereas Laches, considering better of it, admits the practice as to the Scythians, and, in general, all cavalry whatever, he again attacks him with the example of the Lacedaemonian foot--a nation of all other the most obstinate in maintaining their ground--who, in the battle of Plataea, not being able to break into the Persian phalanx, bethought themselves to disperse and retire, that by the enemy supposing they fled, they might break and disunite that vast body of men in the pursuit, and by that stratagem obtained the victory.
       As for the Scythians, 'tis said of them, that when Darius went his expedition to subdue them, he sent, by a herald, highly to reproach their king, that he always retired before him and declined a battle; to which Idanthyrses,--[Herod., iv. 127.]--for that was his name, returned answer, that it was not for fear of him, or of any man living, that he did so, but that it was the way of marching in practice with his nation, who had neither tilled fields, cities, nor houses to defend, or to fear the enemy should make any advantage of but that if he had such a stomach to fight, let him but come to view their ancient places of sepulture, and there he should have his fill.
       Nevertheless, as to cannon-shot, when a body of men are drawn up in the face of a train of artillery, as the occasion of war often requires, it is unhandsome to quit their post to avoid the danger, forasmuch as by reason of its violence and swiftness we account it inevitable; and many a one, by ducking, stepping aside, and such other motions of fear, has been, at all events, sufficiently laughed at by his companions. And yet, in the expedition that the Emperor Charles V. made against us into Provence, the Marquis de Guast going to reconnoitre the city of Arles, and advancing out of the cover of a windmill, under favour of which he had made his approach, was perceived by the Seigneurs de Bonneval and the Seneschal of Agenois, who were walking upon the 'theatre aux ayenes'; who having shown him to the Sieur de Villiers, commissary of the artillery, he pointed a culverin so admirably well, and levelled it so exactly right against him, that had not the Marquis, seeing fire given to it, slipped aside, it was certainly concluded the shot had taken him full in the body. And, in like manner, some years before, Lorenzo de' Medici, Duke of Urbino, and father to the queen-mother--[Catherine de' Medici, mother of Henry III.]--laying siege to Mondolfo, a place in the territories of the Vicariat in Italy, seeing the cannoneer give fire to a piece that pointed directly against him, it was well for him that he ducked, for otherwise the shot, that only razed the top of his head, had doubtless hit him full in the breast. To say truth, I do not think that these evasions are performed upon the account of judgment; for how can any man living judge of high or low aim on so sudden an occasion? And it is much more easy to believe that fortune favoured their apprehension, and that it might be as well at another time to make them face the danger, as to seek to avoid it. For my own part, I confess I cannot forbear starting when the rattle of a harquebuse thunders in my ears on a sudden, and in a place where I am not to expect it, which I have also observed in others, braver fellows than I.
       Neither do the Stoics pretend that the soul of their philosopher need be proof against the first visions and fantasies that surprise him; but, as to a natural subjection, consent that he should tremble at the terrible noise of thunder, or the sudden clatter of some falling ruin, and be affrighted even to paleness and convulsion; and so in other passions, provided his judgment remain sound and entire, and that the seat of his reason suffer no concussion nor alteration, and that he yield no consent to his fright and discomposure. To him who is not a philosopher, a fright is the same thing in the first part of it, but quite another thing in the second; for the impression of passions does not remain superficially in him, but penetrates farther, even to the very seat of reason, infecting and corrupting it, so that he judges according to his fear, and conforms his behaviour to it. In this verse you may see the true state of the wise Stoic learnedly and plainly expressed:--
       "Mens immota manet; lachrymae volvuntur inanes."
       ["Though tears flow, the mind remains unmoved."
       --Virgil, AEneid, iv. 449]
       The Peripatetic sage does not exempt himself totally from perturbations of mind, but he moderates them.
       [The end]
       Montaigne's essay: Of Constancy

Against Idleness
All Things Have Their Season
The Ceremony Of The Interview Of Princes
A Consideration Upon Cicero
Cowardice The Mother Of Cruelty
A Custom Of The Isle Of Cea
Defence Of Seneca And Plutarch
The Letters Of Montaigne
Nine And Twenty Sonnets Of Estienne De La Boitie
Not To Communicate A Man's Honour
Not To Counterfeit Being Sick
Observation On The Means To Carry On A War According To Julius Caesar
Of A Monstrous Child
Of A Saying Of Caesar
Of Age
Of Ancient Customs
Of Anger
Of Books
Of Cannibals
Of Cato The Younger
Of Coaches
Of Conscience
Of Constancy
Of Cripples
Of Cruelty
Of Custom, And That We Should Not Easily Change A Law Received
Of Democritus And Heraclitus
Of Diversion
Of Drunkenness
Of Experience
Of Fear
Of Friendship
Of Giving The Lie
Of Glory
Of Idleness
Of Ill Means Employed To A Good End
Of Judging Of The Death Of Another
Of Liars
Of Liberty Of Conscience
Of Managing the Will
Of Moderation
Of Names
Of One Defect In Our Government
Of Pedantry
Of Physiognomy
Of Posting
Of Prayers
Of Presumption
Of Profit And Honesty
Of Prognostications
Of Quick Or Slow Speech
Of Recompenses Of Honour
Of Repentance
Of Sleep
Of Smells
Of Solitude
Of Sorrow
Of Sumptuary Laws
Of The Affection Of Fathers To Their Children
Of The Arms Of The Parthians
Of the Art of Conference
Of The Battle Of Dreux
Of The Custom Of Wearing Clothes
Of The Education Of Children
Of The Force Of Imagination
Of The Inconstancy Of Our Actions
Of The Inconvenience Of Greatness
Of The Inequality Amongst Us
Of The Most Excellent Men
Of The Parsimony Of The Ancients
Of The Punishment Of Cowardice
Of The Resemblance Of Children To Their Fathers
Of The Roman Grandeur
Of The Uncertainty Of Our Judgment
Of The Vanity Of Words
Of Three Commerces
Of Three Good Women
Of Thumbs
Of Vain Subtleties
Of Vanity
Of Virtue
Of War Horses, Or Destriers
A Proceeding Of Some Ambassadors
The Story Of Spurina
That A Man Is Soberly To Judge Of The Divine Ordinances
That Fortune Is Oftentimes Observed To Act By The Rule Of Reason
That It Is Folly To Measure Truth And Error By Our Own Capacity
That Men Are Justly Punished For Being Obstinate In The Defence Of A Fort
That Men Are Not To Judge Of Our Happiness Till After Death
That Men By Various Ways Arrive At The Same End
That Our Affections Carry Themselves Beyond Us
That Our Desires Are Augmented By Difficulty
That Our Mind Hinders Itself
That The Hour Of Parley Is Dangerous
That The Intention Is Judge Of Our Actions
That The Profit Of One Man Is The Damage Of Another
That The Relish For Good And Evil Depends In Great Measure Upon The Opinion
That The Soul Expends Its Passions Upon False Objects, Where The True Are Wantin
That To Study Philosophy Is To Learn To Die
That We Are To Avoid Pleasures, Even At The Expense Of Life
That We Laugh And Cry For The Same Thing
That We Taste Nothing Pure
To-Morrow's A New Day
Upon Some Verses Of Virgil
Use Makes Perfect
Various Events From The Same Counsel
Whether The Governor Of A Place Besieged Ought Himself To Go Out To Parley