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PART VI
Its now three years since I ended the Treatise which contains all these
things, and that I began to review it, to send it afterwards to the
Presse, when I understood, that persons to whom I submit, and whose
authority can no lesse command my actions, then my own Reason doth my
thoughts, had disapproved an opinion in Physicks, published a little
before by another; of which I will not say that I was, but that indeed I
had observed nothing therein, before their censure, which I could have
imagined prejudiciall either to Religion or the State; or consequently,
which might have hindred me from writing the same, had my Reason
perswaded mee thereto. And this made me fear, lest in the same manner
there might be found some one amongst mine, in which I might have been
mistaken; notwithstanding the great care I always had to admit no new
ones into my belief, of which I had not most certain demonstrations; and
not to write such as might turn to the disadvantage of any body. Which
was sufficient to oblige me to change my resolution of publishing them.
For although the reasons for which I had first of all taken it, were
very strong; yet my inclination, which alwayes made me hate the trade of
Book-making, presently found me out others enough to excuse my self from
it. And these reasons on the one and other side are such, that I am not
only somewhat concern'd to speak them; but happily the Publick also to
know them.
I never did much esteem those things which proceeded from mine own
brain; and so long as I have gathered no other fruits from the Method I
use, but onely that I have satisfied my self in some difficulties which
belong to speculative Sciences, or at least endeavoured to regulate my
Manners by the reasons it taught me, I thought my self not obliged to
write any thing of them. For, as for what concerns Manners, every one
abounds so much in his own sense, That we may finde as many Reformers as
heads, were it permitted to others, besides those whom God hath
established as Soveraigns over his people, or at least, to whom he hath
dispensed grace and zeal enough to be Prophets, to undertake the change
of any thing therein. And although my Speculations did very much please
me, I did beleeve that other men also had some, which perhaps pleas'd
them more. But as soon as I had acquired some generall notions touching
naturall Philosophy, and beginning to prove them in divers particular
difficulties, I observed how far they might lead a man, and how far
different they were from the principles which to this day are in use; I
judg'd, that I could not keep them hid without highly sinning against
the Law, which obligeth us to procure, as much as in us lies, the
general good of all men. For they made it appear to me, that it was
possible to attain to points of knowledge, which may be very profitable
for this life: and that in stead of this speculative Philosophy which is
taught in the Schools, we might finde out a practicall one, by which
knowing the force and workings of Fire, Water, Air, of the Starrs, of
the Heavens, and of all other Bodies which environ us, distinctly, as we
know the several trades of our Handicrafts, we might in the same manner
employ them to all uses to which they are fit, and so become masters and
possessours of Nature. Which is not onely to be desired for the
invention of very many expedients of Arts, which without trouble might
make us enjoy the fruits of the earth, and all the conveniences which
are to be found therein: But chiefly also for the preservation of
health, which (without doubt) is the first good, and the foundation of
all other good things in this life. For even the minde depends so much
on the temper and disposition of the organs of the body, that if it be
possible to finde any way of making men in the generall wiser, and more
able then formerly they were, I beleeve it ought to be sought in
Physick. True it is, that which is now in use contains but few things,
whose benefit is very remarkable: But (without any designe of slighting
of it) I assure my self, there is none, even of their own profession,
but will consent, that whatsoever is known therein, is almost nothing in
companion of what remains to be known. And that we might be freed from
very many diseases, aswell of the body as of the mind, and even also
perhaps from the weaknesses of old age, had we but knowledge enough of
their Causes, and of all the Remedies wherewith Nature hath furnished
us. Now having a designe to employ all my life in the enquiry of so
necessary a Science; and having found a way, the following of which me
thinks might infallibly lead us to it, unless we be hindred by the
shortness of life, or by defect of experiments. I judg'd that there was
no better Remedie against those two impediments, but faithfully to
communicate to the publique, all that little I should discover, and to
invite all good Wits to endevour to advance farther in contributing
every one, according to his inclination and power, to those Experiments
which are to be made, and communicating also to the publique all the
things they should learn; so that the last, beginning where the
precedent ended, and so joyning the lives and labors of many in one, we
might all together advance further then any particular Man could do.
I also observ'd touching Experiments, that they are still so much the
more necessary, as we are more advanc'd in knowledg. For in the
beginning it's better to use those only which of themselves are
presented to our senses, and which we cannot be ignorant of, if we do
but make the least reflections upon them, then to seek out the rarest
and most studied ones. The reason whereof is, that those which are
rarest, doe often deceive, when we seldome know the same of the most
common ones, and that the circumstances on which they depend, are, as it
were, always so particular, and so small, that it's very uneasie to
finde them out. But the order I observed herein was this. First, I
endevoured to finde in generall the Principles or first Causes of
whatsoever is or may be in the world, without considering any thing for
this end, but God alone who created it, or drawing them elsewhere, then
from certain seeds of Truth which naturally are in our souls. After
this, I examined what were the first and most ordinary Effects which
might be deduced from these Causes: And me thinks that thereby I found
out Heavens, Starrs, an Earth; and even on the Earth, Water, Air and
Fire, Minerals, and some other such like things, which are the most
common, and the most simple of all, and consequently the most easie to
be understood. Afterwards, when I would descend to those which were more
particular, there were so many severall ones presented themselves to me,
that I did beleeve it impossible for a humane understanding to
distinguish the forms and species of Bodies which are on the earth, from
an infinite number of others which might be there, had it been the will
of God so to place them: Nor by consequence to apply them to our use,
unless we set the Effects before the Causes, and make use of divers
particular experiments; In relation to which, revolving in my minde all
those objects which ever were presented to my senses, I dare boldly say,
I observed nothing which I could not fitly enough explain by the
principles I had found. But I must also confesse that the power of
Nature is so ample and vast, and these principles are so simple and
generall, that I can observe almost no particular Effect, but that I
presently know it might be deduced from thence in many severall ways:
and that commonly my greatest difficulty is to finde in which of these
ways it depends thereon; for I know no other expedient for that, but
again to seek some experiments, which may be such, that their event may
not be the same, if it be in one of those ways which is to be exprest,
as if it were in another. In fine, I am gotten so far, That (me thinks)
I see well enough what course we ought to hold to make the most part of
those experiments which may tend to this effect. But I also see they
are such, and of so great a number, that neither my hands nor my estate
(though I had a thousand times more then I have) could ever suffice for
all. So that according as I shall hereafter have conveniency to make
more or fewer of them, I shall also advance more or lesse in the
knowledge of Nature, which I hop'd I should make known by the Treatise
which I had written; and therein so clearly shew the benefit which the
Publick may receive thereby, that I should oblige all those in general
who desire the good of Mankinde; that is to say, all those who are
indeed vertuous, (and not so seemingly, or by opinion only) aswell to
communicate such experiments as they have already made, as to help me in
the enquiry of those which are to be made.
But since that time, other reasons have made me alter my opinion, and
think that I truly ought to continue to write of all those things which
I judg'd of any importance, according as I should discover the truth of
them, and take the same care, as if I were to print them; as well that I
might have so much the more occasion throughly to examine them; as
without doubt, we always look more narrowly to what we offer to the
publick view, then to what we compose onely for our own use: and
oftentimes the same things which seemed true to me when I first
conceived them, appear'd afterwards false to me, when I was committing
them to paper: as also that I might lose no occasion of benefiting the
Publick, if I were able, and that if my Writings were of any value,
those to whose hands they should come after my death, might to make what
use of them they think fit.
But that I ought not any wayes to consent that they should be published
during my life; That neither the opposition and controversies, whereto
perhaps they might be obnoxious, nor even the reputation whatsoever it
were, which they might acquire me, might give me any occasion of
mispending the time I had design'd to employ for my instruction; for
although it be true that every Man is oblig'd to procure, as much as in
him lies, the good of others; and that to be profitable to no body, is
properly to be good for nothing: Yet it's as true, that our care ought
to reach beyond the present time; and that it were good to omit those
things which might perhaps conduce to the benefit of those who are
alive, when our designe is, to doe others which shall prove farr more
advantagious to our posterity; As indeed I desire it may be known that
the little I have learnt hitherto, is almost nothing in comparison of
what I am ignorant of; and I doe not despair to be able to learn: For
it's even the same with those, who by little and little discover the
truth in Learning; as with those who beginning to grow rich, are less
troubled to make great purchases, then they were before when they were
poorer, to make little ones. Or else one may compare them to Generals of
Armies, whose Forces usually encrease porportionably to their Victories;
and who have need of more conduct to maintain themselves after the loss
of a battail, then after the gaining one, to take Towns and Provinces.
For to endeavour to overcome all the difficulties and errours which
hinder us to come to the knowledg of the Truth, is truly to fight
battails. And to receive any false opinion touching a generall or
weighty matter, is as much as to lose one; there is far more dexterity
required to recover our former condition, then to make great progresses
where our Principles are already certain. For my part, if I formerly
have discovered some Truths in Learning, as I hope my Discourse will
make it appear I have, I may say, they are but the products and
dependances of five or six principall difficulties which I have
overcome, and which I reckon for so many won Battails on my side.
Neither will I forbear to say; That I think, It's only necessary for me
to win two or three more such, wholly to perfect my design. And that I
am not so old, but according to the ordinary course of Nature, I may
have time enough to effect it. But I beleeve I am so much the more
obliged to husband the rest of my time, as I have more hopes to employ
it well; without doubt, I should have divers occasions of impeding it,
should I publish the grounds of my Physicks. For although they are
almost all so evident, that to beleeve them, it's needfull onely to
understand them; and that there is none whereof I think my self unable
to give demonstration. Yet because it's impossible that they should
agree with all the severall opinions of other men, I foresee I should
often be diverted by the opposition they would occasion.
It may be objected, These oppositions might be profitable, as well to
make me know my faults, as if any thing of mine were good to make others
by that means come to a better understanding thereof; and as many may
see more then one man, beginning from this time to make use of my
grounds, they might also help me with their invention. But although I
know my self extremely subject to fail, and do never almost trust my
first thoughts; yet the experience I have of the objections which may be
made unto me, hinder me from hoping for any profit from them; For I have
often tried the judgments as well of those whom I esteem'd my friends,
as of others whom I thought indifferent, and even also of some, whose
malignity and envie did sufficiently discover what the affection of my
friends might hide. But it seldom happened that any thing was objected
against me, which I had not altogether foreseen, unless it were very
remote from my Subject: So that I never almost met with any Censurer of
my opinions, that seemed unto me either less rigorous, or less equitable
then my self. Neither did I ever observe, that by the disputations
practiced in the Schools any Truth which was formerly unknown, was ever
discovered. For whilest every one seeks to overcome, men strive more to
maintain probabilities, then to weigh the reasons on both sides; and
those who for a long time have been good Advocates, are not therefore
the better Judges afterwards.
As for the benefit which others may receive from the communication of my
thoughts, it cannot also be very great, forasmuch as I have not yet
perfected them, but that it is necessary to add many things thereunto,
before a usefull application can be made of them. And I think I may say
without vanity, That if there be any one capable thereof, it must be my
self, rather then any other. Not but that there may be divers wits in
the world incomparably better then mine; but because men cannot so well
conceive a thing and make it their own, when they learn it of another,
as when they invent it themselves: which is so true in this Subject,
that although I have often explain'd some of my opinions to very
understanding men, and who, whilest I spake to them, seem'd very
distinctly to conceive them; yet when they repeated them, I observ'd,
that they chang'd them almost always in such a manner, that I could no
longer own them for mine. Upon which occasion, I shall gladly here
desire those who come after me, never to beleeve those things which may
be delivered to them for mine, when I have not published them my self.
And I do not at all wonder at the extravagancies which are attributed to
all those ancient Philosophers, whose Writings we have not; neither do I
thereby judge, that their thoughts were very irrationall, seeing they
were the best Wits of their time; but onely that they have been ill
convey'd to us: as it appears also, that never any of their followers
surpass'd them. And I assure my self, that the most passionate of those,
who now follow _Aristotle_, would beleeve himself happy, had he but as
much knowledge of Nature as he had, although it were on condition that
he never might have more: They are like the ivie, which seeks to climb
no higher then the trees which support it, and ever after tends
downwards again when it hath attain'd to the height thereof: for, me
thinks also, that such men sink downwards; that is to say, render
themselves in some manner lesse knowing, then if they did abstain from
studying; who being not content to know all which is intelligibly set
down in their Authour, will besides that, finde out the solution of
divers difficulties of which he says nothing, and perhaps never thought
of them: yet their way of Philosophy is very fit for those who have but
mean capacities: For the obscurity of the distinctions and principles
which they use causeth them to speak of all things as boldly, as if they
knew them, and maintain all which they say, against the most subtill and
most able; so that there is no means left to convince them. Wherein they
seem like to a blinde man, who, to fight without disadvantage against
one that sees, should challenge him down into the bottom of a very dark
cellar: And I may say, that it is these mens interest, that I should
abstain from publishing the principles of the Philosophy I use, for
being most simple and most evident, as they are, I should even do the
same in publishing of them, as if I opened some windows, to let the day
into this cellar, into which they go down to fight. But even the best
Wits have no reason to wish for the knowledge of them: for if they will
be able to speak of all things, and acquire the reputation of being
learned, they will easily attain to it by contenting themselves with
probability, which without much trouble may be found in all kinde of
matters; then in seeking the Truth, which discovers it self but by
little and little, in some few things; and which, when we are to speak
of others, oblige us freely to confesse our ignorance of them. But if
they prefer the knowledge of some few truths to the vanity of seeming to
be ignorant of nothing, as without doubt they ought to do, and will
undertake a designe like mine, I need not tell them any more for this
purpose, but what I have already said in this Discourse: For if they
have a capacity to advance farther then I have done, they may with
greater consequence finde out of themselves whatsoever I think I have
found; Forasmuch as having never examined any thing but by order, it's
certain, that what remains yet for me to discover, is in it self more
difficult and more hid, then what I have already here before met with;
and they would receive much less satisfaction in learning it from me,
then from themselves. Besides that, the habit which they would get by
seeking first of all the easie things, and passing by degrees to others
more difficult, will be more usefull to them, then all my instructions.
As I for my part am perswaded, that had I been taught from my youth all
the Truths whose demonstrations I have discovered since, and had taken
no pains to learn them, perhaps I should never have known any other, or
at least, I should never have acquired that habit, and that faculty
which I think I have, still to finde out new ones, as I apply my self to
the search of them. And in a word, if there be in the world any work
which cannot be so well ended by any other, as by the same who began it,
it's that which I am now about.
It's true, That one man will not be sufficient to make all the
experiments which may conduce thereunto: But withall, he cannot
profitably imploy other hands then his own, unlesse it be those of
Artists, or others whom he hires, and whom the hope of profit (which is
a very powerfull motive) might cause exactly to do all those things he
should appoint them: For as for voluntary persons, who by curiosity or a
desire to learn, would perhaps offer themselves to his help, besides
that commonly they promise more then they perform, and make onely fair
propositions, whereof none ever succeeds, they would infallibly be paid
by the solution of some difficulties, or at least by complements and
unprofitable entertainments, which could not cost him so little of his
time, but he would be a loser thereby. And for the Experiments which
others have already made, although they would even communicate them to
him (which those who call them Secrets would never do,) they are for
the most part composed of so many circumstances, or superfluous
ingredients, that it would be very hard for him to decypher the truth of
them: Besides, he would find them all so ill exprest, or else so false,
by reason that those who made them have laboured to make them appear
conformable to their principles; that if there were any which served
their turn, they could not at least be worth the while which must be
imployed in the choice of them. So that, if there were any in the world
that were certainly known to be capable of finding out the greatest
things, and the most profitable for the Publick which could be, and that
other men would therefore labour alwayes to assist him to accomplish his
Designes; I do not conceive that they could do more for him, then
furnish the expence of the experiments whereof he stood in need; and
besides, take care only that he may not be by any body hindred of his
time. But besides that, I do not presume so much of my Self, as to
promise any thing extraordinary, neither do I feed my self with such
vain hopes, as to imagine that the Publick should much interesse it self
in my designes; I have not so base a minde, as to accept of any favour
whatsoever, which might be thought I had not deserved.
All these considerations joyned together, were the cause three years
since why I would not divulge the Treatise I had in hand; and which is
more, that I resolved to publish none whilest I lived, which might be so
general, as that the Grounds of my Philosophy might be understood
thereby. But since, there hath been two other reasons have obliged me to
put forth some particular Essays, and to give the Publick some account
of my Actions and Designes. The first was, that if I failed therein,
divers who knew the intention I formerly had to print some of my
Writings, might imagine that the causes for which I forbore it, might
be more to my disadvantage then they are. For although I do not affect
glory in excess; or even, (if I may so speak) that I hate it, as far as
I judge it contrary to my rest, which I esteem above all things: Yet
also did I never seek to hide my actions as crimes, neither have I been
very wary to keep my self unknown; as well because I thought I might
wrong my self, as that it might in some manner disquiet me, which would
again have been contrary to the perfect repose of my minde which I seek.
And because having alwayes kept my self indifferent, caring not whether
I were known or no, I could not chuse but get some kinde of reputation,
I thought that I ought to do my best to hinder it at least from being
ill. The other reason which obliged me to write this, is, that observing
every day more and more the designe I have to instruct my self, retarded
by reason of an infinite number of experiments which are needful to me,
and which its impossible for me to make without the help of others;
although I do not so much flatter my self, as to hope that the Publick,
shares much in my concernments; yet will I not also be so much wanting
to my self, as to give any cause to those who shall survive me, to
reproach this, one day to me, That I could have left them divers things
far beyond what I have done, had I not too much neglected to make them
understand wherein they might contribute to my designe.
And I thought it easie for me to choose some matters, which being not
subject to many Controversies, nor obliging me to declare any more of my
Principles then I would willingly, would neverthelesse expresse clearly
enough, what my abilities or defects are in the Sciences. Wherein I
cannot say whether I have succeeded or no; neither will I prevent the
judgment of any man by speaking of my own Writings: but I should be
glad they might be examin'd; and to that end I beseech all those who
have any objections to make, to take the pains to send them to my
Stationer, that I being advertised by him, may endeavour at the same
time to adjoyn my Answer thereunto: and by that means, the Reader seeing
both the one and the other, may the more easily judge of the Truth. For
I promise, that I will never make any long Answers, but only very freely
confesse my own faults, if I find them; or if I cannot discover them,
plainly say what I shal think requisite in defence of what I have writ,
without adding the explanation of any new matter, that I may not
endlesly engage my self out of one into another.
Now if there be any whereof I have spoken in the beginning, of the
Opticks and of the Meteors, which at first jarr, by reason that I call
them Suppositions, and that I seem not willing to prove them; let a man
have but the patience to read the whole attentively, and I hope he will
rest satisfied: For (me thinks) the reasons follow each other so
closely, that as the later are demonstrated by the former, which are
their Causes; the former are reciprocally proved by the later, which are
their Effects. And no man can imagine that I herein commit the fault
which the Logicians call a _Circle_; for experience rendring the
greatest part of these effects most certain, the causes whence I deduce
them serve not so much to prove, as to explain them; but on the
contrary, they are those which are proved by them. Neither named I them
Suppositions, that it might be known that I conceive my self able to
deduce them from those first Truths which I have before discovered: But
that I would not expresly do it to crosse certain spirits, who imagine
that they know in a day al what another may have thought in twenty
yeers, as soon as he hath told them but two or three words; and who are
so much the more subject to erre, and less capable of the Truth, (as
they are more quick and penetrating) from taking occasion of erecting
some extravagant Philosophy on what they may beleeve to be my
Principles, and lest the fault should be attributed to me. For as for
those opinions which are wholly mine, I excuse them not as being new,
because that if the reasons of them be seriously considered, I assure my
self, they will be found so plain, and so agreeable to common sense,
that they will seem less extraordinary and strange then any other which
may be held on the same Subjects. Neither do I boast that I am the first
Inventor of any of them; but of this indeed, that I never admitted any
of them, neither because they had, or had not been said by others, but
only because Reason perswaded me to them.
If Mechanicks cannot so soon put in practise the Invention which is set
forth in the Opticks, I beleeve that therefore men ought not to condemn
it; forasmuch as skill and practice are necessary for the making and
compleating the Machines I have described; so that no circumstance
should be wanting. I should no less wonder if they should succeed at
first triall, then if a man should learn in a day to play excellently
well on a Lute, by having an exact piece set before him. And if I write
in French, which is the language of my Country, rather then in Latin,
which is that of my Tutors, 'tis because I hope such who use their meer
naturall reason, wil better judge of my opinions, then those who only
beleeve in old Books. And for those who joyn a right understanding with
study, (who I only wish for my Judges) I assure my self, they will not
be so partiall to the Latin, as to refuse to read my reasons because I
expresse them in a vulgar tongue.
To conclude, I will not speak here in particular of the progresse I
hoped to make hereafter in Learning; Nor engage my self by any promise
to the Publick, which I am not certain to perform. But I shall onely
say, That I am resolved to employ the remainder of my life in no other
thing but the study to acquire some such knowledge of Nature as may
furnish us with more certain rules in Physick then we hitherto have had:
And that my inclination drives me so strongly from all other kind of
designes, chiefly from those which cannot be profitable to any, but by
prejudicing others; that if any occasion obliged me to spend my time
therein, I should beleeve I should never succeed therein: which I here
declare, though I well know it conduceth not to make me considerable in
the world; neither is it my ambition to be so. And I shall esteem my
self always more obliged to those by whose favour I shal without
disturbance enjoy my ease, then to them who should proffer me the most
honourable imployment of the earth.
FINIS. _