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Discourse on Method, A
PART III
Rene Descartes
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       PART III
       And finally, as it is not enough, before commencing to rebuild the house
       in which we live, that it be pulled down, and materials and builders
       provided, or that we engage in the work ourselves, according to a plan
       which we have beforehand carefully drawn out, but as it is likewise
       necessary that we be furnished with some other house in which we may live
       commodiously during the operations, so that I might not remain irresolute
       in my actions, while my reason compelled me to suspend my judgement, and
       that I might not be prevented from living thenceforward in the greatest
       possible felicity, I formed a provisory code of morals, composed of three
       or four maxims, with which I am desirous to make you acquainted.
       The first was to obey the laws and customs of my country, adhering firmly
       to the faith in which, by the grace of God, I had been educated from my
       childhood and regulating my conduct in every other matter according to the
       most moderate opinions, and the farthest removed from extremes, which
       should happen to be adopted in practice with general consent of the most
       judicious of those among whom I might be living. For as I had from that
       time begun to hold my own opinions for nought because I wished to subject
       them all to examination, I was convinced that I could not do better than
       follow in the meantime the opinions of the most judicious; and although
       there are some perhaps among the Persians and Chinese as judicious as
       among ourselves, expediency seemed to dictate that I should regulate my
       practice conformably to the opinions of those with whom I should have to
       live; and it appeared to me that, in order to ascertain the real opinions
       of such, I ought rather to take cognizance of what they practised than of
       what they said, not only because, in the corruption of our manners, there
       are few disposed to speak exactly as they believe, but also because very
       many are not aware of what it is that they really believe; for, as the act
       of mind by which a thing is believed is different from that by which we
       know that we believe it, the one act is often found without the other.
       Also, amid many opinions held in equal repute, I chose always the most
       moderate, as much for the reason that these are always the most convenient
       for practice, and probably the best (for all excess is generally vicious),
       as that, in the event of my falling into error, I might be at less
       distance from the truth than if, having chosen one of the extremes, it
       should turn out to be the other which I ought to have adopted. And I
       placed in the class of extremes especially all promises by which somewhat
       of our freedom is abridged; not that I disapproved of the laws which, to
       provide against the instability of men of feeble resolution, when what is
       sought to be accomplished is some good, permit engagements by vows and
       contracts binding the parties to persevere in it, or even, for the
       security of commerce, sanction similar engagements where the purpose
       sought to be realized is indifferent: but because I did not find anything
       on earth which was wholly superior to change, and because, for myself in
       particular, I hoped gradually to perfect my judgments, and not to suffer
       them to deteriorate, I would have deemed it a grave sin against good
       sense, if, for the reason that I approved of something at a particular
       time, I therefore bound myself to hold it for good at a subsequent time,
       when perhaps it had ceased to be so, or I had ceased to esteem it such.
       My second maxim was to be as firm and resolute in my actions as I was
       able, and not to adhere less steadfastly to the most doubtful opinions,
       when once adopted, than if they had been highly certain; imitating in this
       the example of travelers who, when they have lost their way in a forest,
       ought not to wander from side to side, far less remain in one place, but
       proceed constantly towards the same side in as straight a line as
       possible, without changing their direction for slight reasons, although
       perhaps it might be chance alone which at first determined the selection;
       for in this way, if they do not exactly reach the point they desire, they
       will come at least in the end to some place that will probably be
       preferable to the middle of a forest. In the same way, since in action it
       frequently happens that no delay is permissible, it is very certain that,
       when it is not in our power to determine what is true, we ought to act
       according to what is most probable; and even although we should not remark
       a greater probability in one opinion than in another, we ought
       notwithstanding to choose one or the other, and afterwards consider it, in
       so far as it relates to practice, as no longer dubious, but manifestly
       true and certain, since the reason by which our choice has been
       determined is itself possessed of these qualities. This principle was
       sufficient thenceforward to rid me of all those repentings and pangs of
       remorse that usually disturb the consciences of such feeble and uncertain
       minds as, destitute of any clear and determinate principle of choice,
       allow themselves one day to adopt a course of action as the best, which
       they abandon the next, as the opposite.
       My third maxim was to endeavor always to conquer myself rather than
       fortune, and change my desires rather than the order of the world, and in
       general, accustom myself to the persuasion that, except our own thoughts,
       there is nothing absolutely in our power; so that when we have done our
       best in things external to us, all wherein we fail of success is to be
       held, as regards us, absolutely impossible: and this single principle
       seemed to me sufficient to prevent me from desiring for the future
       anything which I could not obtain, and thus render me contented; for since
       our will naturally seeks those objects alone which the understanding
       represents as in some way possible of attainment, it is plain, that if we
       consider all external goods as equally beyond our power, we shall no more
       regret the absence of such goods as seem due to our birth, when deprived
       of them without any fault of ours, than our not possessing the kingdoms
       of China or Mexico, and thus making, so to speak, a virtue of necessity,
       we shall no more desire health in disease, or freedom in imprisonment,
       than we now do bodies incorruptible as diamonds, or the wings of birds to
       fly with. But I confess there is need of prolonged discipline and
       frequently repeated meditation to accustom the mind to view all objects in
       this light; and I believe that in this chiefly consisted the secret of the
       power of such philosophers as in former times were enabled to rise
       superior to the influence of fortune, and, amid suffering and poverty,
       enjoy a happiness which their gods might have envied. For, occupied
       incessantly with the consideration of the limits prescribed to their power
       by nature, they became so entirely convinced that nothing was at their
       disposal except their own thoughts, that this conviction was of itself
       sufficient to prevent their entertaining any desire of other objects; and
       over their thoughts they acquired a sway so absolute, that they had some
       ground on this account for esteeming themselves more rich and more
       powerful, more free and more happy, than other men who, whatever be the
       favors heaped on them by nature and fortune, if destitute of this
       philosophy, can never command the realization of all their desires.
       In fine, to conclude this code of morals, I thought of reviewing the
       different occupations of men in this life, with the view of making choice
       of the best. And, without wishing to offer any remarks on the employments
       of others, I may state that it was my conviction that I could not do
       better than continue in that in which I was engaged, viz., in devoting my
       whole life to the culture of my reason, and in making the greatest
       progress I was able in the knowledge of truth, on the principles of the
       method which I had prescribed to myself. This method, from the time I had
       begun to apply it, had been to me the source of satisfaction so intense as
       to lead me to, believe that more perfect or more innocent could not be
       enjoyed in this life; and as by its means I daily discovered truths that
       appeared to me of some importance, and of which other men were generally
       ignorant, the gratification thence arising so occupied my mind that I was
       wholly indifferent to every other object. Besides, the three preceding
       maxims were founded singly on the design of continuing the work of self-
       instruction. For since God has endowed each of us with some light of
       reason by which to distinguish truth from error, I could not have believed
       that I ought for a single moment to rest satisfied with the opinions of
       another, unless I had resolved to exercise my own judgment in examining
       these whenever I should be duly qualified for the task. Nor could I have
       proceeded on such opinions without scruple, had I supposed that I should
       thereby forfeit any advantage for attaining still more accurate, should
       such exist. And, in fine, I could not have restrained my desires, nor
       remained satisfied had I not followed a path in which I thought myself
       certain of attaining all the knowledge to the acquisition of which I was
       competent, as well as the largest amount of what is truly good which I
       could ever hope to secure Inasmuch as we neither seek nor shun any object
       except in so far as our understanding represents it as good or bad, all
       that is necessary to right action is right judgment, and to the best
       action the most correct judgment, that is, to the acquisition of all the
       virtues with all else that is truly valuable and within our reach; and the
       assurance of such an acquisition cannot fail to render us contented.
       Having thus provided myself with these maxims, and having placed them in
       reserve along with the truths of faith, which have ever occupied the
       first place in my belief, I came to the conclusion that I might with
       freedom set about ridding myself of what remained of my opinions. And,
       inasmuch as I hoped to be better able successfully to accomplish this work
       by holding intercourse with mankind, than by remaining longer shut up in
       the retirement where these thoughts had occurred to me, I betook me again
       to traveling before the winter was well ended. And, during the nine
       subsequent years, I did nothing but roam from one place to another,
       desirous of being a spectator rather than an actor in the plays exhibited
       on the theater of the world; and, as I made it my business in each matter
       to reflect particularly upon what might fairly be doubted and prove a
       source of error, I gradually rooted out from my mind all the errors which
       had hitherto crept into it. Not that in this I imitated the sceptics who
       doubt only that they may doubt, and seek nothing beyond uncertainty
       itself; for, on the contrary, my design was singly to find ground of
       assurance, and cast aside the loose earth and sand, that I might reach
       the rock or the clay. In this, as appears to me, I was successful enough;
       for, since I endeavored to discover the falsehood or incertitude of the
       propositions I examined, not by feeble conjectures, but by clear and
       certain reasonings, I met with nothing so doubtful as not to yield some
       conclusion of adequate certainty, although this were merely the inference,
       that the matter in question contained nothing certain. And, just as in
       pulling down an old house, we usually reserve the ruins to contribute
       towards the erection, so, in destroying such of my opinions as I judged to
       be Ill-founded, I made a variety of observations and acquired an amount of
       experience of which I availed myself in the establishment of more certain.
       And further, I continued to exercise myself in the method I had
       prescribed; for, besides taking care in general to conduct all my thoughts
       according to its rules, I reserved some hours from time to time which I
       expressly devoted to the employment of the method in the solution of
       mathematical difficulties, or even in the solution likewise of some
       questions belonging to other sciences, but which, by my having detached
       them from such principles of these sciences as were of inadequate
       certainty, were rendered almost mathematical: the truth of this will be
       manifest from the numerous examples contained in this volume. And thus,
       without in appearance living otherwise than those who, with no other
       occupation than that of spending their lives agreeably and innocently,
       study to sever pleasure from vice, and who, that they may enjoy their
       leisure without ennui, have recourse to such pursuits as are honorable, I
       was nevertheless prosecuting my design, and making greater progress in the
       knowledge of truth, than I might, perhaps, have made had I been engaged in
       the perusal of books merely, or in holding converse with men of letters.
       These nine years passed away, however, before I had come to any
       determinate judgment respecting the difficulties which form matter of
       dispute among the learned, or had commenced to seek the principles of any
       philosophy more certain than the vulgar. And the examples of many men of
       the highest genius, who had, in former times, engaged in this inquiry,
       but, as appeared to me, without success, led me to imagine it to be a work
       of so much difficulty, that I would not perhaps have ventured on it so
       soon had I not heard it currently rumored that I had already completed
       the inquiry. I know not what were the grounds of this opinion; and, if my
       conversation contributed in any measure to its rise, this must have
       happened rather from my having confessed my Ignorance with greater freedom
       than those are accustomed to do who have studied a little, and expounded
       perhaps, the reasons that led me to doubt of many of those things that by
       others are esteemed certain, than from my having boasted of any system of
       philosophy. But, as I am of a disposition that makes me unwilling to be
       esteemed different from what I really am, I thought it necessary to
       endeavor by all means to render myself worthy of the reputation accorded
       to me; and it is now exactly eight years since this desire constrained me
       to remove from all those places where interruption from any of my
       acquaintances was possible, and betake myself to this country, in which
       the long duration of the war has led to the establishment of such
       discipline, that the armies maintained seem to be of use only in enabling
       the inhabitants to enjoy more securely the blessings of peace and where,
       in the midst of a great crowd actively engaged in business, and more
       careful of their own affairs than curious about those of others, I have
       been enabled to live without being deprived of any of the conveniences to
       be had in the most populous cities, and yet as solitary and as retired as
       in the midst of the most remote deserts. _